2026-04-14T05:34:59Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10256/263782025-02-12T19:59:19Zcom_2072_452955com_2072_2054col_2072_452964

Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems Barberà, Salvador Berga, Dolors Moreno, Bernardo Nicolò, Antonio Gibbard-Satterthwaite, Teoria de Gibbard-Satterthwaite theory Arrow, Paradoxa de Arrow paradox Decisió multicriteri Multiple criteria decision making We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict) Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature 2025-02-12T19:59:18Z 2025-02-12T19:59:18Z 2025-02-12T19:59:18Z 2025-01-07 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion peer-reviewed http://hdl.handle.net/10256/26378 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s00355-024-01575-6 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0176-1714 info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/1432-217X Attribution 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Springer Social Choice and Welfare, 2025, vol. undefined, p. null Articles publicats (D-EC)