2026-04-17T11:30:51Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:10256/263782025-02-12T19:59:19Zcom_2072_452955com_2072_2054col_2072_452964
RECERCAT
author
Barberà, Salvador
author
Berga, Dolors
author
Moreno, Bernardo
author
Nicolò, Antonio
2025-02-12T19:59:18Z
2025-02-12T19:59:18Z
2025-01-07
http://hdl.handle.net/10256/26378
We introduce a novel principle that we call weak pairwise justifiability, which applies to a large class of collective choice rules, including the social choice functions and the social welfare functions about which the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem and Arrow’s impossibility theorem are predicated, respectively. We prove that, under appropriate qualifications, our principle is a common root for these two classical results, when applied to rules defined over the full domain of weak preference orders (also for strict)Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature
Attribution 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Gibbard-Satterthwaite, Teoria de
Gibbard-Satterthwaite theory
Arrow, Paradoxa de
Arrow paradox
Decisió multicriteri
Multiple criteria decision making
Weak pairwise justifiability as a common root of Arrow’s and the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorems
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion peer-reviewed