2026-04-13T01:41:09Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10256/263732025-03-18T20:02:14Zcom_2072_452955com_2072_2054col_2072_452964

Social networks, norm-enforcing ties and cooperation Goetz, Renan-Ulrich Marco Renau, Jorge Xarxes socials Social networks Normes socials Social norms Cooperativisme Cooperation Política pública Political planning We study cooperation and group pressure on social networks by introducing a new concept termed norm-enforcing ties. By combining network characteristics and agents’ actions, direct and indirect norm-enforcing ties extend and refine the concept of social ties as well as the role of the tightness of a group as drivers of group pressure and cooperation. The results show that a strong commitment by agents with collective interests, or a high degree of confrontation between agents minimizes the effect of indirect norm-enforcing ties on cooperation. The analysis in terms of the agent’s utility reveals that an increase in indirect norm-enforcing ties does not necessarily lead to a decrease in the critical mass of compliers supporting cooperation. We demonstrate that network-oriented policies are more efficient in promoting cooperation than are standard economic policy instruments when the expected value of direct norm-enforcing ties is sufficiently large compared to the tightness of the group. Otherwise, standard economic policy instruments are more efficient Open Access funding provided thanks to the CRUE-CSIC agreement with Springer Nature 2025-01-06 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion peer-reviewed info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/doi/10.1007/s11403-024-00435-x info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/1860-711X info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/eissn/1860-7128 Attribution 4.0 International http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Springer Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, 2025, vol. undefined, p. null Articles publicats (D-EC)