<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-17T05:34:09Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:10256/10735" metadataPrefix="qdc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:10256/10735</identifier><datestamp>2024-06-14T09:48:46Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_452955</setSpec><setSpec>com_2072_2054</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_453065</setSpec></header><metadata><qdc:qualifieddc xmlns:qdc="http://dspace.org/qualifieddc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/ http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2006/01/06/dc.xsd http://purl.org/dc/terms/ http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2006/01/06/dcterms.xsd http://dspace.org/qualifieddc/ http://www.ukoln.ac.uk/metadata/dcmi/xmlschema/qualifieddc.xsd">
   <dc:title>Conciencia y dualismo</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Pineda Oliva, David</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Dualisme</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Dualism</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Consciència</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Consciousness</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Materialisme</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Materialism</dc:subject>
   <dcterms:abstract>In this paper I present an objection to the Kripke-Chalmers version of the conceivability argument against physicalism. I also assess the prospects of this physicalist response in the light of two further difficulties: the epistemology of modality and the property dualism argument</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:abstract>En este trabajo presento una objeción a la versión Kripke-Chalmers del argumento concebibilista contra el fisicismo. Asimismo evalúo dicha respuesta fisicista a la luz de otras dos dificultades: la epistemología de la modalidad y el argumento del dualismo de propiedades</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:dateAccepted>2024-06-14T09:48:46Z</dcterms:dateAccepted>
   <dcterms:available>2024-06-14T09:48:46Z</dcterms:available>
   <dcterms:created>2024-06-14T09:48:46Z</dcterms:created>
   <dcterms:issued>2008</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion</dc:type>
   <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10256/10735</dc:identifier>
   <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/altIdentifier/issn/0210-1602</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>Tots els drets reservats</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
   <dc:publisher>KRK Ediciones</dc:publisher>
   <dc:source>© Teorema : revista internacional de filosofía, 2008, vol. 27, núm. 3, p. 131-147</dc:source>
   <dc:source>Articles publicats (D-FS)</dc:source>
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