<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-17T02:08:07Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:10256/10735" metadataPrefix="marc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:10256/10735</identifier><datestamp>2024-06-14T09:48:46Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_452955</setSpec><setSpec>com_2072_2054</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_453065</setSpec></header><metadata><record xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
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      <subfield code="a">dc</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Pineda Oliva, David</subfield>
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   <datafield ind2=" " ind1=" " tag="260">
      <subfield code="c">2008</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">In this paper I present an objection to the Kripke-Chalmers version of the conceivability argument against physicalism. I also assess the prospects of this physicalist response in the light of two further difficulties: the epistemology of modality and the property dualism argument</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">En este trabajo presento una objeción a la versión Kripke-Chalmers del argumento concebibilista contra el fisicismo. Asimismo evalúo dicha respuesta fisicista a la luz de otras dos dificultades: la epistemología de la modalidad y el argumento del dualismo de propiedades</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">http://hdl.handle.net/10256/10735</subfield>
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   <datafield tag="653" ind2=" " ind1=" ">
      <subfield code="a">Dualisme</subfield>
   </datafield>
   <datafield tag="653" ind2=" " ind1=" ">
      <subfield code="a">Dualism</subfield>
   </datafield>
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      <subfield code="a">Consciència</subfield>
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   <datafield tag="653" ind2=" " ind1=" ">
      <subfield code="a">Consciousness</subfield>
   </datafield>
   <datafield tag="653" ind2=" " ind1=" ">
      <subfield code="a">Materialisme</subfield>
   </datafield>
   <datafield tag="653" ind2=" " ind1=" ">
      <subfield code="a">Materialism</subfield>
   </datafield>
   <datafield ind2="0" ind1="0" tag="245">
      <subfield code="a">Conciencia y dualismo</subfield>
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