2026-04-13T04:06:14Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/9412025-12-24T02:04:55Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization Garoupa, Nuno Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa organized crime punishment plea-bargaining Business Economics and Industrial Organization In this paper, we take an organizational view of organized crime. In particular, we study the organizational consequences of product illegality attending at the following characteristics: (i) contracts are not enforceable in court, (ii) all participants are subject to the risk of being punished, (iii) employees present a major threat to the entrepreneur having the most detailed knowledge concerning participation, (iv) separation between ownership and management is difficult because record-keeping and auditing augments criminal evidence. 2017-07-26T10:50:25Z 2017-07-26T10:50:25Z 1999-03-01 2017-07-23T02:04:23Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=366 http://hdl.handle.net/10230/941 eng Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 366 L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess application/pdf application/pdf