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oai:recercat.cat:10230/708112025-07-05T22:32:18Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452952

2025-07-05T22:32:18Z urn:hdl:10230/70811 Economic principles for the enforcement of abuse of dominance provisions Fumagalli, Chiara Motta, Massimo Monopolis Competència -- Dret i legislació Contractes d'exclusivitat The European Commission (EC) has recently announced its intention to issue Guidelines on exclusionary abuses. In this paper, we explain how economics can and should be used to inform a sound and effects-based approach in the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU. In particular, the EC should be guided only by a consumer welfare standard; exclusive dealing and exclusivity rebates should be subject to a (rebuttable) presumption of harm; price-cost tests are meaningful only for predation and other practices that do not reference rivals; essentiality of the input should not be a requirement for vertical foreclosure cases of any type, but such cases should be limited only to dominant firms that satisfy certain criteria. 2025-07-05T22:32:18Z 2025-07-05T22:32:18Z 2025-07-01T14:45:10Z 2024 2025-07-01T14:45:10Z info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion http://hdl.handle.net/10230/70811 Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 2024;20(1-2):85-107 © Oxford University Press. This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced version of an article accepted for publication in Journal of Competition Law & Economics following peer review. The version of record Fumagalli C, Motta M. Economic principles for the enforcement of abuse of dominance provisions. J Compet Law Econ. 2024;20(1-2):85-107. DOI: 10.1093/joclec/nhae003 is available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/joclec/nhae003 and https://academic.oup.com/jcle/article-abstract/20/1-2/85/7631485 info:eu-repo/semantics/embargoedAccess Oxford University Press