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   <dc:title>Opinion dynamics via search engines (and other algorithmic gatekeepers)</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Germano, Fabrizio</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Sobbrio, Francesco</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Ranking algorithm</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Information aggregation</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Asymptotic learning</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Popularity ranking</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Personalized ranking</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Misinformation</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Fake news</dc:subject>
   <dcterms:abstract>Includes supplementary materials for the online appendix.</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:abstract>Ranking algorithms are the information gatekeepers of the Internet era. We develop a stylized model to study the interplay between a ranking algorithm and individual clicking behavior. We consider a search engine that uses an algorithm based on popularity and on personalization. The analysis shows the presence of a feedback effect, whereby individuals clicking on websites indirectly provide information about their private signals to successive searchers through the popularity-ranking algorithm. Accordingly, when individuals provide sufficiently positive feedback to the ranking algorithm, popularity-based rankings tend to aggregate information while personalization acts in the opposite direction. Moreover, we find that, under fairly general conditions, popularity-based rankings generate an advantage of the fewer effect: fewer websites reporting a given signal attract relatively more traffic overall. This highlights a novel, ranking-driven channel that can potentially explain the diffusion of misinformation, as websites reporting incorrect information may attract an amplified amount of traffic precisely because they are few.</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:abstract>Germano acknowledges financial support from grant ECO2017-89240-P (AEI/FEDER, UE), from Fundación BBVA (grant “Innovación e Información en la Economía Digital”) and also from the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, through the Severo Ochoa Programme for Centres of Excellence in R&amp;amp;D (SEV-2015-0563).</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:issued>2025-01-27T12:55:04Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2025-01-27T12:55:04Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2020</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion</dc:type>
   <dc:relation>Journal of Public Economics. 2020 Jul;187:104188</dc:relation>
   <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/2PE/ECO2017-89240-P</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>© Elsevier http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2020.104188.</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
   <dc:publisher>Elsevier</dc:publisher>
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