2026-04-13T13:57:40Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/6912025-12-18T01:49:25Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

Optimal magnitude and probability of fines Garoupa, Nuno crime probability and severity of sanctions law enforcement Business Economics and Industrial Organization The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them. 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z 2000-04-01 2017-07-23T02:05:12Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 454 L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess