2026-04-13T07:15:33Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:10230/6912025-12-18T01:49:25Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953
RECERCAT
author
Garoupa, Nuno
2017-07-26T10:50:56Z2017-07-26T10:50:56Z2000-04-012017-07-23T02:05:12Z
The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on
the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment,
and suggests that detection probability and fines are
substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of
substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and
punishment, these instruments may become complements. When
offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions
is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in
detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value
of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to
prosecute them.
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
crime
probability and severity of sanctions
law enforcement
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
Optimal magnitude and probability of fines
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper