2026-04-13T01:45:44Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/6912025-12-18T01:49:25Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Garoupa, Nuno author 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z 2017-07-26T10:50:56Z 2000-04-01 2017-07-23T02:05:12Z The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them. crime probability and severity of sanctions law enforcement Business Economics and Industrial Organization Optimal magnitude and probability of fines