2026-04-14T07:50:55Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/594222025-12-18T01:05:56Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452952

urn:hdl:10230/59422 Understanding and disagreement in belief ascription Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín Belief ascription concept possession disagreement communication understanding sense It seems uncontroversial that Dalton wrongly believed that atoms are indivisible. However, the correct analysis of Dalton’s belief and the way it relates to contemporary beliefs about atoms is, on closer inspection, far from straightforward. In this paper, I introduce four features that any candidate analysis is plausibly bound to respect. I argue that theories that individuate concepts at the level of understanding are doomed to fail in this endeavor. I formally sketch an alternative and suggest that cases such as the one presented provide support for the claim that the genuine source for concept individuation is public sharable thought. This research has been supported by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Ministry of Economy and Knowledge of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (research projects [FFI2013-41415-P] and [FFI2012-35153]) and the consolidated research group GRECC [SGR2014-406]. 2024-03-15T07:11:20Z 2024-03-15T07:11:20Z 2016 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion International Journal of Philosophical Studies. 2016;24(2):183-200. info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/3PN/FFI2012-35153 info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/FFI2013-41415-P © This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in International Journal of Philosophical Studies on 11 Jan 2016, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/09672559.2015.1126339 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Taylor & Francis