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urn:hdl:10230/59361 De se content and action generalisation. Philosophical papers Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín Ever since John Perry's developments in the late 70s, it is customary among philosophers to take de se contents as essentially tied to the explanation of action. The target explanation appeals to a subject-specific notion of de se content capable of capturing behavioural differences in central cases. But a subject-specific de se content leads us, I argue, to a subject-specific notion of intentional action that prevents basic forms of generalisation. Although this might be seen as a welcome revision of our pre-theoretical conceptions, I propose, instead, a strategy to circumvent this rather unexpected result: to reject subject-specific de se contents in favour of subject-specific ways of thinking that do not enter into the content of one's attitudes. This work has received financial support from the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Department of Economy and Knowledge (Government of Catalonia) and also from the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union via the research projects FFI2016-80588-R and FFI2015-63892-P (MINECO, AEI/FEDER, EU) 2024-03-08T07:14:08Z 2024-03-08T07:14:08Z 2017 info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion Philosophical papers. 2017;46(2):315-44. info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/2016-80588-R info:eu-repo/grantAgreement/ES/1PE/2015-63892-p © This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical papers on 19 Dec 2017, available online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/05568641.2017.1299588 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Taylor & Francis