2026-04-13T01:06:00Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:10230/593602025-12-26T11:27:09Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452952
RECERCAT
author
Verdejo Aparicio, Víctor Martín
2024-03-08T07:14:05Z2024-03-08T07:14:05Z2018
Theorists of first person thought seem to be faced with a pervasive dilemma: either accept the view that varying reference and sense are bound up together in first person thought, but then reject person-to-person shareability; or else, maintain the shareability of first person thought or belief at the price of giving up the connection between sense and subject-to-subject changing reference. Here, the author will argue that this is, in fact, a spurious dilemma based largely upon a failure to appreciate, if not the existence, at least the crucial importance of the distinction between types, instantiable types and instantiated types of thought or belief. Only the level of the instantiable type is relevant for a proper assessment of the question of whether two different subjects have the same first person thought.This work has been financed by the Secretary for Universities and Research of the Department of Economy and Knowledge (Government of Catalonia) and the Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Government of Spain) and the European Union through the research projects FFI 2016-80588-R and FFI 2015-63892-p (MINECO AEI/FEDER, EU).
© Brill Academic Publishers http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/18756735-000053 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
type
instantiable type
instantiated type
first person thought
On having the same first person thought
info:eu-repo/semantics/article info:eu-repo/semantics/acceptedVersion