<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-19T14:20:55Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:10230/54924" metadataPrefix="marc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:10230/54924</identifier><datestamp>2025-12-20T16:41:24Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_6</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_452952</setSpec></header><metadata><record xmlns="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.loc.gov/MARC21/slim http://www.loc.gov/standards/marcxml/schema/MARC21slim.xsd">
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      <subfield code="a">Michaels, Jeffrey H.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">Scholars focused on NATO nuclear strategy during the Cold War have devoted little attention to the dynamics of how the Alliance would decide to use nuclear weapons. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the internal debates about how a nuclear use decision would be taken, particularly balancing the desire to ensure adequate consultation of the non-nuclear members without undermining the credibility of NATO’s nuclear deterrent by giving them a veto. To avoid undermining Alliance cohesion, the nuclear use decision process was kept deliberately vague, despite the problems that would almost certainly have arisen in a war.</subfield>
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      <subfield code="a">“No annihilation without representation”: NATO nuclear use decision-making during the Cold War</subfield>
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