<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-13T07:38:59Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:10230/44773" metadataPrefix="qdc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:10230/44773</identifier><datestamp>2025-12-20T01:55:22Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_6</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_452953</setSpec></header><metadata><qdc:qualifieddc xmlns:qdc="http://dspace.org/qualifieddc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:dcterms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/ http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2006/01/06/dc.xsd http://purl.org/dc/terms/ http://dublincore.org/schemas/xmls/qdc/2006/01/06/dcterms.xsd http://dspace.org/qualifieddc/ http://www.ukoln.ac.uk/metadata/dcmi/xmlschema/qualifieddc.xsd">
   <dc:title>Blockchain: The birth of decentralized governance</dc:title>
   <dc:title/>
   <dc:creator>Arruñada, Benito</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Garicano, Luis</dc:creator>
   <dc:subject>Blockchain</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>platforms</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>networks</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>hold‐up</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>coordination</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>relational capital</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>incomplete contracts</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>decentralized governance</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Business Economics and Industrial Organization</dc:subject>
   <dcterms:abstract>By allowing networks to split, decentralized blockchain platforms protect members against hold up, but hinder coordination, given that adaptation decisions are ultimately decentralized. The current solutions to improve coordination, based on  premining  cryptocoins, taxing members and incentivizing developers, are insufficient. For blockchain to fulfill its promise and outcompete centralized firms, it needs to develop new forms of  soft  decentralized governance (anarchic, aristocratic, democratic, and autocratic) that allow networks to avoid bad equilibria.</dcterms:abstract>
   <dcterms:issued>2020-05-25T09:27:05Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2020-05-25T09:27:05Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2018-04-10</dcterms:issued>
   <dcterms:issued>2020-05-25T09:25:36Z</dcterms:issued>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper</dc:type>
   <dc:relation>Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 1608</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>L&amp;apos;accés als continguts d&amp;apos;aquest document queda condicionat a l&amp;apos;acceptació de les condicions d&amp;apos;ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
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