2026-04-17T17:21:14Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:10230/447732025-12-20T01:55:22Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953
RECERCAT
author
Arruñada, Benito
author
Garicano, Luis
2020-05-25T09:27:05Z2020-05-25T09:27:05Z2018-04-102020-05-25T09:25:36Z
By allowing networks to split, decentralized blockchain platforms protect members against hold up, but hinder coordination, given that adaptation decisions are ultimately decentralized. The current solutions to improve coordination, based on premining cryptocoins, taxing members and incentivizing developers, are insufficient. For blockchain to fulfill its promise and outcompete centralized firms, it needs to develop new forms of soft decentralized governance (anarchic, aristocratic, democratic, and autocratic) that allow networks to avoid bad equilibria.
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
Blockchain
platforms
networks
hold‐up
coordination
relational capital
incomplete contracts
decentralized governance
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
Blockchain: The birth of decentralized governance
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper