2026-04-18T06:04:42Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/447732025-12-20T01:55:22Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Arruñada, Benito author Garicano, Luis author 2020-05-25T09:27:05Z 2020-05-25T09:27:05Z 2018-04-10 2020-05-25T09:25:36Z By allowing networks to split, decentralized blockchain platforms protect members against hold up, but hinder coordination, given that adaptation decisions are ultimately decentralized. The current solutions to improve coordination, based on premining cryptocoins, taxing members and incentivizing developers, are insufficient. For blockchain to fulfill its promise and outcompete centralized firms, it needs to develop new forms of soft decentralized governance (anarchic, aristocratic, democratic, and autocratic) that allow networks to avoid bad equilibria. Blockchain platforms networks hold‐up coordination relational capital incomplete contracts decentralized governance Business Economics and Industrial Organization Blockchain: The birth of decentralized governance