2026-04-13T08:14:34Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/447362025-12-21T01:48:15Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Bird, Daniel author Frug, Alexander author 2020-05-25T09:26:58Z 2020-05-25T09:26:58Z 2019-04-03 2020-05-25T09:25:54Z A common feature of dynamic interactions is that the environment in which they occur typically changes, perhaps stochastically, over time. We consider a general uctuating contracting environment with symmetric information, and identify a systematic eect of the uctuations in the environment on optimal contracts. We develop a notion of a separable activity that corresponds to a large class of contractual components, and provide a tight condition under which these components manifest a form of seniority: any change that occurs in these components over time, under an optimal contract, favors the agent. We illustrate how our results can be applied in various economic settings. dynamic contracting stochastic opportunities. Microeconomics Monotone contracts