2026-04-17T05:40:19Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/446972025-12-24T02:05:49Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Mariella, Gonzales author León-Ciliotta, Gianmarco author Martinez, Luis R. author 2020-05-25T09:26:50Z 2020-05-25T09:26:50Z 2018-12-01 2020-05-25T09:26:03Z We combine two natural experiments, multiple empirical strategies and administrative data to study voters' response to marginal changes to the fine for electoral abstention in Peru. A smaller fine leads to a robust decrease in voter turnout. However, the drop in turnout caused by a full ne reduction is less than 20% the size of that caused by an exemption from compulsory voting, indicating the predominance of the non-monetary incentives provided by the mandate to vote. Additionally, almost 90% of the votes generated by a marginally larger ne are blank or invalid, lending support to the hypothesis of rational abstention. Higher demand for information and larger long-run effects following an adjustment to the value of the ne point to the existence of informational frictions that limit adaptation to institutional changes. voter turnout voter registration compulsory voting informational frictions external validity peru How effective are monetary incentives to vote? Evidence from a nationwide policy