2026-04-17T04:43:36Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:10230/3502025-12-13T00:30:17Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953
RECERCAT
author
Caggese, Andrea
author
Cuñat, Vicente
2017-07-26T10:50:23Z2017-07-26T10:50:23Z2006-06-012017-07-23T02:10:59Z
This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and the
employment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employment
contracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows the
effects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Once
calibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use more
intensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of the
total employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We test
and confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturing
firms with detailed information about the type of workers employed
by the firms and about firm financing constraints.
L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
finacing constraints
employment
fixed-term contracts
Finance and Accounting
Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper