2026-04-17T05:17:17Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/3502025-12-13T00:30:17Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Caggese, Andrea author Cuñat, Vicente author 2017-07-26T10:50:23Z 2017-07-26T10:50:23Z 2006-06-01 2017-07-23T02:10:59Z This paper studies the interactions between financing constraints and the employment decisions of firms when both fixed-term and permanent employment contracts are available. We first develop a dynamic model that shows the effects of financing constraints and firing costs on employment decisions. Once calibrated, the model shows that financially constrained firms tend to use more intensely fixed term workers, and to make them absorb a larger fraction of the total employment volatility than financially unconstrained firms do. We test and confirm the predictions of the model on a unique panel data of Italian manufacturing firms with detailed information about the type of workers employed by the firms and about firm financing constraints. finacing constraints employment fixed-term contracts Finance and Accounting Financing constraints and fixed-term employment contracts