2026-04-14T02:31:25Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/requestoai:recercat.cat:10230/338742025-12-23T02:14:46Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953
RECERCAT
author
Motta, Massimo
author
Tarantino, Emanuele
2018-02-14T15:29:52Z2018-02-14T15:29:52Z2017-08-302018-02-14T15:29:26Z
It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and hence are pro-competitive. To study the effects of mergers, we rewrite a game with simultaneous price and cost-reducing investment choices as one where firms only choose prices, and make use of aggregative game theory. We find no support for that claim: absent efficiency gains, the merger lowers total investments and consumer surplus. Only if it entails sufficient efficiency gains, will it be pro-competitive. We also show there exist classes of models for which the results obtained with cost-reducing investments are
equivalent to those with quality-enhancing investments.
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horizontal mergers
innovation
investments
network-sharing agreements
competition.
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
The effect of horizontal mergers, when firms compete in prices and investments
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper