2026-04-14T05:00:25Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/338742025-12-23T02:14:46Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Motta, Massimo author Tarantino, Emanuele author 2018-02-14T15:29:52Z 2018-02-14T15:29:52Z 2017-08-30 2018-02-14T15:29:26Z It has been suggested that mergers, by increasing concentration, raise incentives to invest and hence are pro-competitive. To study the effects of mergers, we rewrite a game with simultaneous price and cost-reducing investment choices as one where firms only choose prices, and make use of aggregative game theory. We find no support for that claim: absent efficiency gains, the merger lowers total investments and consumer surplus. Only if it entails sufficient efficiency gains, will it be pro-competitive. We also show there exist classes of models for which the results obtained with cost-reducing investments are equivalent to those with quality-enhancing investments. horizontal mergers innovation investments network-sharing agreements competition. Business Economics and Industrial Organization The effect of horizontal mergers, when firms compete in prices and investments