2026-04-18T06:05:57Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/272942025-12-19T01:42:37Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Levine, David K. author Modica, Salvatore author 2016-09-15T13:09:09Z 2016-09-15T13:09:09Z 2016-05 How can a small special interest group successfully get an inefficient transfer at the expense of a much larger group with many more resources available for lobbying? We consider a simple model of collusive organizations that provide a public good in the form of effort and have a fixed cost per member of acting collusively. Our key result is that the willingness of such a group to pay for a/ngiven prize depends on whether the prize is fungible - that is, whether the prize can be used to pay for itself. If the prize is fungible, as in the case of a transfer payment, a smaller group always has an advantage. If the prize is non-fungible - civil rights for example - willingness to pay first increases then decreases with the size of the group. We use the theory to study agenda setting/nboth with and without blackmail by the politician showing that in general the small group is not too greedy: when it wins it optimally chooses to pre-empt the large group by choosing a prize small enough to equal the large group participation cost. The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396. Organization Group Collusion Public good Size, fungibility and the strengh of lobbying organizations