2026-04-18T04:43:45Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/207502025-12-18T01:49:35Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Hurkens, Sjaak author Vulkan, Nir author 2020-05-25T09:27:07Z 2020-05-25T09:27:07Z 1996-02-01 2020-05-25T09:16:43Z Before firms decide whether to enter a new market or not, they have the opportunity to buy information about several variables that might affect the profitability of this market. Our model differs from the existing literature on endogenous information acquisition in two respects: (1) there is uncertainty about more than one variable, and (2) information is acquired secretly. When the cost of acquiring information is small, entry decisions will be as if there was perfect information. Equilibria where each firm acquires only a small amount of information are more robust than the socially undesirable equilibria where all firms gather all information. Examples illustrate the importance of assumptions (1) and (2). Microeconomics Information acquisition and entry