2026-04-13T00:54:56Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/207292025-12-23T02:14:39Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

urn:hdl:10230/20729 Research joint ventures in an international economy Motta, Massimo Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics D'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) model is extended to study alternative configurations of research agreements in a two--country integrated world economy. Under unambiguous conditions on spillovers we show that: 1) Allowing national firms to cooperate in R\&D confers them an advantage over foreign rivals, an effect similar to R\&D subsidies. 2) In a policy game, each government would allow national cooperative agreements. 3) Contrary to other trade policies which lead to a ``prisoners' dilemma'' result, welfare in both countries increases when they both allow R\&D cooperation. 4) Welfare is even higher if a generalized (international) coalition is formed. 2017-07-26T10:51:00Z 2017-07-26T10:51:00Z 1995-11-01 2017-07-23T02:02:15Z info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 147 L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess