<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><?xml-stylesheet type="text/xsl" href="static/style.xsl"?><OAI-PMH xmlns="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/OAI-PMH.xsd"><responseDate>2026-04-17T15:00:36Z</responseDate><request verb="GetRecord" identifier="oai:www.recercat.cat:10230/1229" metadataPrefix="oai_dc">https://recercat.cat/oai/request</request><GetRecord><record><header><identifier>oai:recercat.cat:10230/1229</identifier><datestamp>2025-12-25T01:07:11Z</datestamp><setSpec>com_2072_6</setSpec><setSpec>col_2072_452953</setSpec></header><metadata><oai_dc:dc xmlns:oai_dc="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:doc="http://www.lyncode.com/xoai" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc/ http://www.openarchives.org/OAI/2.0/oai_dc.xsd">
   <dc:title>An experiment on Nash implementation</dc:title>
   <dc:creator>Cabrales, Antonio</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Charness, Gary</dc:creator>
   <dc:creator>Corchón, Luis</dc:creator>
   <dc:contributor>Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d&amp;apos;Economia i Empresa</dc:contributor>
   <dc:subject>implementation</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>experiments</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>mechanisms</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>leex</dc:subject>
   <dc:subject>Behavioral and Experimental Economics</dc:subject>
   <dc:description>We perform an experimental test of Maskin&amp;apos;s canonical mechanism for Nash
implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 
outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this 
mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of 
the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were 
generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can 
also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We 
offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk 
preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the 
mixed strategy equilibria of the game.</dc:description>
   <dc:date>2017-07-26T12:07:57Z</dc:date>
   <dc:date>2017-07-26T12:07:57Z</dc:date>
   <dc:date>1998-06-01</dc:date>
   <dc:date>2017-07-23T02:06:45Z</dc:date>
   <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper</dc:type>
   <dc:identifier>https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=300</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 51, (2003), pp. 161-193,</dc:identifier>
   <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/10230/1229</dc:identifier>
   <dc:language>eng</dc:language>
   <dc:relation>Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 300</dc:relation>
   <dc:rights>L&amp;apos;accés als continguts d&amp;apos;aquest document queda condicionat a l&amp;apos;acceptació de les condicions d&amp;apos;ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/</dc:rights>
   <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
   <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
   <dc:format>application/pdf</dc:format>
</oai_dc:dc></metadata></record></GetRecord></OAI-PMH>