2026-04-17T06:05:20Zhttps://recercat.cat/oai/request

oai:recercat.cat:10230/12292025-12-25T01:07:11Zcom_2072_6col_2072_452953

00925njm 22002777a 4500 dc Cabrales, Antonio author Charness, Gary author Corchón, Luis author 2017-07-26T12:07:57Z 2017-07-26T12:07:57Z 1998-06-01 2017-07-23T02:06:45Z We perform an experimental test of Maskin's canonical mechanism for Nash implementation, using 3 subjects in non-repeated groups, as well as 3 outcomes, states of nature, and integer choices. We find that this mechanism succesfully implements the desired outcome a large majority of the time and an imbedded comprehension test indicates that subjects were generally able to comprehend their decision tasks. The performance can also be improved by imposing a fine on non designated dissidents. We offer some explanations for the imperfect implementation, including risk preferences, the possibilities that agents have for collusion, and the mixed strategy equilibria of the game. implementation experiments mechanisms leex Behavioral and Experimental Economics An experiment on Nash implementation