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Dealing with Tyranny: International Sanctions and Autocrats’ Duration
Escribà-Folch, Abel; Wright, Joseph G.
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals
This paper enquires into whether economic sanctions are effective in destabilizing authoritarian rulers. We argue that this effect is mediated by the type of authoritarian regime against which sanctions are imposed. Thus, personalist regimes and monarchies, which are more dependent on aid and resource rents to maintain their patronage networks, are more likely to be affected by sanctions. In contrast, single-party and military regimes are able to maintain (and even increase) their tax revenues and to reallocate their expenditures and so increase their levels of cooptation. Data on sanction episodes, authoritarian rulers and regimes covering the period 1946–2000 have allowed us to test our hypotheses. To do so, duration models have been run, and the results confirm that personalist autocrats are more vulnerable to foreign pressure. Concretely, the analysis of the modes of exit reveals that sanctions increase the likelihood of an irregular change of ruler, such as a coup. Sanctions are basically ineffective when targeting single-party or military regimes.
32 - Política
35 - Administració pública. Govern. Assumptes militars
Sancions econòmiques
Naciones Unidas -- Sancions
Sancions (Dret internacional)
Estabilitat política
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25 p.
Working Paper
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals
IBEI Working Papers;2008/16

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