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Stochastic evolution of rules for playing normal form games
Germano, Fabrizio
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
The evolution of boundedly rational rules for playing normal form games is studied within stationary environments ofstochastically changing games. Rules are viewed as algorithms prescribing strategies for the different normal formgames that arise. It is shown that many of the folk results of evolutionary game theory typically obtained witha fixed game and fixed strategies carry over to the present case. The results are also related to recent experimentson rules and games.
evolutionary dynamics
stochastic dynamics
bounded rationality
normal form games
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