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Minimax regret and strategic uncertainty
Renou, Ludovic; Schlag, Karl
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
This paper introduces a new solution concept, a minimax regret equilibrium, which allows for the possibility that players are uncertain about the rationality and conjectures of their opponents. We provide several applications of our concept. In particular, we consider pricesetting environments and show that optimal pricing policy follows a non-degenerate distribution. The induced price dispersion is consistent with experimental and empirical observations (Baye and Morgan (2004)).
11-06-2008
Microeconomics
minimax regret
rationality
conjectures
price dispersion
auction
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