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Corporate finance and the monetary transmission mechanism
Bolton, Patrick; Freixas, Xavier
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
This paper analyzes the transmission mechanisms of monetarypolicy in a general equilibrium model of securities marketsand banking with asymmetric information. Banks' optimal asset/liability policy is such that in equilibrium capital adequacy constraints are always binding. Asymmetric information about banks' net worth adds a cost to outside equity capital, which limits the extent to which banks can relax their capital constraint. In this context monetarypolicy does not affect bank lending through changes in bank liquidity. Rather, it has the effect of changing theaggregate composition of financing by firms. The model also produces multiple equilibria, one of which displays all the features of a "credit crunch". Thus, monetary policy can also have large effects when it induces a shift from one equilibrium to the other.
Finance and Accounting
asymmetric information
liabilities structure
capital regulation
monetary policy
transmission mechanism
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