The evolution of conventions under incomplete information

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dc.contributor	Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.contributor.author	Jacobsen, Hans Jorgen
dc.contributor.author	Jensen, Mogens
dc.contributor.author	Sloth, Birgitte
dc.date	1997-06-01
dc.identifier.citation	https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=475
dc.identifier.citation	Economic Theory, vol. 25(1), pp. 171-185, 2005
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10230/646
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation	Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 475
dc.rights	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject	Microeconomics
dc.subject	games of incomplete information
dc.subject	bayesian equilibrium
dc.subject	evolution
dc.subject	learning
dc.subject	conventions
dc.title	The evolution of conventions under incomplete information
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper