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A non-quasi-competitive Cournot oligopoly with stability
Villanova, Ramon; Paradís, Jaume; Viader, Pelegrí
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.
cournot equilibrium
non-cooperative oligopoly
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