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Credit cycles in theory and experiment
Bosch-Domènech, Antoni; Sáez, María
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetricgame -which we interpret as a borrowerlender relation-, study itsevolutionary dynamics in a random matching set-up, and tests itspredictions. The model provides conditions for the existence ofcredit markets and credit cycles. The theoretical predictions seemto be good approximations of the experimental results.
2005-09-15
Behavioral and Experimental Economics
cycles
evolutionary dynamics
games
experiments
leex
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