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Hot vs. cold: Sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games
Brandts, Jordi; Charness, Gary
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
In experiments with two-person sequential games we analyzewhether responses to favorable and unfavorable actions dependon the elicitation procedure. In our hot treatment thesecond player responds to the first player s observed actionwhile in our cold treatment we follow the strategy method and have the second player decide on a contingent action foreach and every possible first player move, without firstobserving this move. Our analysis centers on the degree towhich subjects deviate from the maximization of their pecuniaryrewards, as a response to others actions. Our results show nodifference in behavior between the two treatments. We also findevidence of the stability of subjects preferences with respectto their behavior over time and to the consistency of theirchoices as first and second mover.
15-09-2005
Behavioral and Experimental Economics
strategy method
experiment
preference stability
sequential responses
leex
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