Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/43869
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| Title: | Lobbying of Firms by Voters |
| Authors: | Dahm, Matthias
Dur, Robert
Glazerz, Amihai |
| Other authors: | Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
| Subjects: | Vot -- Investigació
Política pública
Grups de pressió
Política -- Aspectes socials
Empreses -- Aspectes polítics |
| Creation Date: | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2009-22 |
| Abstract: | A firm may induce voters or elected politicians to support a policy it favors by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representatives support the policy. In equilibrium, no one vote may be decisive, and the policy may gain strong support though the majority of districts suffer from adoption of the program. When votes reveal information about the district, the firm's implicit promise or threat can be credible. |
| CDU: | 32 - Politics |
| Appears in Collections: | Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia
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