Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/43862
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| Title: | Information Dispersion and Equilibrium Multiplicity |
| Authors: | Manzano, Carolina
Vives, Xavier |
| Other authors: | Universitat Rovira i Virgili. Departament d'Economia |
| Subjects: | Informació -- Aspectes econòmics
Incertesa (Teoria de la informació)
Eficiència (Estadística)
Mercat de capitals |
| Creation Date: | 2009 |
| Series/Report no.: | Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia;2009-20 |
| Abstract: | This paper studies the implications of correlation of private signals
about the liquidation value of a risky asset in a variation of a standard
noisy rational expectations model in which traders receive endowment
shocks which are private information and have a common component.
We
nd that a necessary condition to generate multiple linear partially
revealing rational expectations equilibria is the existence of several sources
of information dispersion. In this context equilibrium multiplicity tends
to occur when information is more dispersed. A necessary condition to
have strategic complementarity in information acquisition is to have mul-
tiple equilibria. When the equilibrium is unique there is strategic substi-
tutability in information acquisition, corroborating the result obtained in
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
JEL Classi
cation: D82, D83, G14
Keywords: Multiplicity of equilibria, strategic complementarity, asym-
metric information. |
| CDU: | 336 - Finance |
| Appears in Collections: | Documents de treball del Departament d'Economia
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