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Bargaining efficiency and screening: An experimental investigation
Charness, Gary
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
This paper investigates whether information about fairness types canbe useful in lowering dispute costs and enhancing bargaining efficiency.An experiment was conducted in which subjects were first screened usinga dictator game, with the allocations chosen used to separate participantsinto two types. Mutually anonymous pairs of subjects then bargained, witha dispute cost structure imposed. Sorting with identification reducesdispute costs; there are also significant differences in bargainingefficiency across pairing types. Information about types is crucial forthese differences and also strongly affects the relative bargainingsuccess of the two types and the hypothetical optimal bargaining strategy.
15-09-2005
Behavioral and Experimental Economics
bargaining efficiency
dispute resolution
experiment
fairness
sorting
leex
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