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Efficient interval scoring rules
Schlag, Karl; van der Weele, Joël
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
Scoring rules that elicit an entire belief distribution through the elicitation of point beliefsare time-consuming and demand considerable cognitive e¤ort. Moreover, the results are validonly when agents are risk-neutral or when one uses probabilistic rules. We investigate a classof rules in which the agent has to choose an interval and is rewarded (deterministically) onthe basis of the chosen interval and the realization of the random variable. We formulatean e¢ ciency criterion for such rules and present a speci.c interval scoring rule. For single-peaked beliefs, our rule gives information about both the location and the dispersion of thebelief distribution. These results hold for all concave utility functions.
02-11-2009
Microeconomics
belief elicitation
scoring rules
subjective probabilities
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