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Immigration policy with partisan parties
Llavador, Humberto; Solano-García, Angel
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
This paper analyzes the political economy of immigration when the salient electoralissue is the level of immigrants and the relevant immigration policy is the expenditurein immigration control. We consider that immigration affects voters? welfarethrough economic and non economic factors. We model political competition `a laWittman with the ideology of parties endogenously determined at equilibrium. Atequilibrium, parties propose different levels of immigration, located to the left and tothe right of the median voter?s ideal point, and combine skilled and unskilled workersamong their constituencies. Numerical simulations provide the levels of immigrationproposed by the two parties and the composition of parties? constituencies as we varythe efficacy of immigration control and the intensity of immigration aversion.
Labour, Public, Development and Health Economics
ideological parties
unskilled and skilled labor
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