dc.contributor |
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals |
dc.contributor.author |
Robotti, Paola |
dc.date.accessioned |
2009-09-18T14:07:58Z |
dc.date.accessioned |
2020-11-09T16:20:17Z |
dc.date.available |
2009-09-18T14:07:58Z |
dc.date.available |
2020-11-09T16:20:17Z |
dc.date.created |
2009-08 |
dc.date.issued |
2009-08 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1886-2802 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/41070 |
dc.format.extent |
28 p. |
dc.format.extent |
384718 bytes |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
IBEI Working Papers;2009/20 |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original i l'institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
dc.subject.other |
Mercats financers |
dc.subject.other |
Mercats financers -- Estats Units d'Amèrica |
dc.subject.other |
Finances -- Política governamental |
dc.subject.other |
Fons de cobertura |
dc.subject.other |
Fons de cobertura -- Estats Units d'Amèrica |
dc.title |
Private Governance of Financial Markets: the US Regulatory Regime on Hedge Funds |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.description.abstract |
The article investigates the private governance of financial markets by looking at the evolution of the regulatory debate on hedge funds in the US market. It starts from the premise that the privatization of regulation is always the result of a political decision and analyzes how this decision came about and was implemented in the case of hedge funds. The starting point is the failure of two initiatives on hedge funds that US regulators launched between 1999 an 2004, which the analysis explains by elaborating the concept of self-capture. Facing a trade off between the need to tackle publicly demonized issues and the difficulty of monitoring increasingly sophisticated and powerful private markets, regulators purposefully designed initiatives that were not meant to succeed, that is, they “self-captured” their own activity. By formulating initiatives that were inherently flawed, regulators saved their public role and at the same time paved the way for the privatization of hedge fund regulation. This explanation identifies a link between the failure of public initiatives and the success of private ones. It illustrates a specific case of formation of private authority in financial markets that points to a more general practice emerging in the regulation of finance. |