dc.contributor |
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals |
dc.contributor.author |
Konstantinidis, Nikitas |
dc.date.accessioned |
2009-09-18T13:58:22Z |
dc.date.accessioned |
2020-11-09T16:20:16Z |
dc.date.available |
2009-09-18T13:58:22Z |
dc.date.available |
2020-11-09T16:20:16Z |
dc.date.created |
2009-07 |
dc.date.issued |
2009-07 |
dc.identifier.issn |
1886-2802 |
dc.identifier.uri |
http://hdl.handle.net/2072/41069 |
dc.format.extent |
32 p. |
dc.format.extent |
820259 bytes |
dc.format.mimetype |
application/pdf |
dc.language.iso |
eng |
dc.publisher |
Institut Barcelona d'Estudis Internacionals |
dc.relation.ispartofseries |
IBEI Working Papers;2009/19 |
dc.rights |
Aquest document està subjecte a una llicència d'ús de Creative Commons, amb la qual es permet copiar, distribuir i comunicar públicament l'obra sempre que se'n citin l'autor original i l'institut i no se'n faci cap ús comercial ni obra derivada, tal com queda estipulat en la llicència d'ús (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/es/) |
dc.subject.other |
Economia -- Aspectes polítics |
dc.subject.other |
Renda -- Distribució |
dc.subject.other |
Recursos naturals |
dc.subject.other |
Economia -- Creixement |
dc.subject.other |
Creixement econòmic |
dc.title |
The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution |
dc.type |
info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper |
dc.subject.udc |
01 - Bibliografia. Catàlegs |
dc.description.abstract |
I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions. |