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Influence activity and the organization of research and development
Cassiman, Bruno
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
The organizational design of research and development conditions theincentives of the researchers of the research project. In particular,the organizational form determines the allocation of effort of theresearcher between time spent on research and time spent lobbying management. Researchers prefer to spend their time on research. However,the researchers only get utility from performing research if theproject is approved for its full duration. Spending time lobbyingmanagement for the continuation of the researcher s project increasesthe probability that the management observes a favorable signal aboutthe project. Organizing a research joint venture increases theflexibility of the organizational form with respect to the continuationdecision. For low correlation between the signals of the partners aboutthe expected profitability of the project, we find that the organizationof a research joint venture reduces influence activity by the researchersand increases expected profits of the partners. For high correlationbetween the signals, internal research projects lower influence activityby the researchers. We try to relate the correlation of the partnerssignals to the characteristics of basic research versus more appliedresearch projects, and find that the model is consistent with theobservation that research joint ventures seem involved in more basicresearch projects compared to internal R&D departments, whichconcentrate on more applied research.
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
research joint ventures
influence activity
signal jamming
incomplete contracts
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