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How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms
Arruñada, Benito; González, Manuel
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.
15-09-2005
Business Economics and Industrial Organization
theory of the firm
team production
share contracts
profit sharing
remuneration systems
self-enforcement
fishing firms
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