Use this identifier to quote or link this document: http://hdl.handle.net/2072/3764

Equilibrium play and best response to (Stated) beliefs in constant sum games
Rey-Biel, Pedro
Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica; Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica
We report experimental results on one-shot two person 3x3 constant sum games played by non-economists without previous experience in the laboratory. Although strategically our games are very similar to previous experiments in which game theory predictions fail dramatically, 80% of actions taken in our experiment coincided with the prediction of the unique Nash equilibrium in pure strategies and 73% of actions were best responses to elicited beliefs. We argue how social preferences, presentation effects and belief elicitation procedures may influence how subjects play in simple but non trivial games and explain the diferences we observe with respect to previous work.
2007-03-28
Jocs, Teoria de
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Working Paper
Working papers; 676.07
         

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