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Auctions of licences and market structure
Rodríguez, Gustavo
Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
This paper studies sequential auctions of licences to operate in amarket where those firms that obtain at least one licence then engage ina symmetric market game. I employ a new refinement of Nash equilibrium,the concept of {\sl Markovian recursively undominated equilibrium}.The unique solution satisfies the following properties: (i) when severalfirms own licences before the auction (incumbents), new entrants buylicences in each stage, and (ii) when there is no more than one incumbent,either the single firm preempts entry altogether or entry occurs inevery stage, depending on the parameter configuration.
2005-09-15
Microeconomics
auctions
game theory
industrial organization
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