Endogenous Stackelberg leadership

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dc.contributor	Universitat Pompeu Fabra. Departament d'Economia i Empresa
dc.contributor.author	van Damme, Eric
dc.contributor.author	Hurkens, Sjaak
dc.date	1996-11-01
dc.identifier.citation	https://econ-papers.upf.edu/ca/paper.php?id=190
dc.identifier.citation	Games and Economic Behavior, 28, 1, (1999), pp. 105-129
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10230/713
dc.format	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng
dc.relation	Economics and Business Working Papers Series; 190
dc.rights	L'accés als continguts d'aquest document queda condicionat a l'acceptació de les condicions d'ús establertes per la següent llicència Creative Commons
dc.rights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.rights	http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/es/
dc.subject	duopoly
dc.subject	stackelberg
dc.subject	equilibrium selection
dc.subject	Microeconomics
dc.title	Endogenous Stackelberg leadership
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/workingPaper
dc.description.abstract	We consider a linear quantity setting duopoly game and analyzewhich of the players will commit when both players have the possibility todo so. To that end, we study a 2-stage game in which each player caneither commit to a quantity in stage 1 or wait till stage 2. We show thatcommitting is more risky for the high cost firm and that, consequently,risk dominance considerations, as in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), allowthe conclusion that only the low cost firm will choose to commit.Hence, the low cost firm will emerge as the endogenous Stackelberg leader.