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Títol:	Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in tax enforcement
Autor/a:	Durán Cabré, José María; Esteller Moré, Alejandro; Salvadori, Luca
Altres autors:	Universitat de Barcelona
Abstract:	Tax auditing parameters have been largely overlooked by the literature as policy-making instruments of any relevance; however, enforcement strategies are critical elements of the tax burden. In this paper, we show that, in a federal framework, tax auditing policies can serve as additional tools for regional interaction. We examine the presence of this interaction by adopting a spatial econometric approach. We employ a spatial panel autoregressive model and obtain results that are congruent with standard theory, corroborating the presence of horizontal competition between regions in their tax auditing policies. We also find that once regional governments acquire legal power, the opaque competition in enforcement policies appears to switch in part to a more transparent competition in statutory tax parameters.
Matèries:	-Política fiscal -Impostos -Reforma fiscal -Fiscal policy -Taxation -Tax reform
Drets:	(c) Springer Verlag, 2015
Tipus de document:	Article Article - Versió acceptada
Publicat per:	Springer Verlag
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